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ABSTRACT
I argue that an adequate semantics for physical theories must be grounded on an account
of the way that a theory provides formal and conceptual resources appropriate for—
that have propriety in—the construction of representations of the physical systems the
theory purports to treat. I sketch a precise, rigorous definition of the required forms of
propriety, and argue that semantic content accrues to scientific representations of physical
systems primarily in virtue of the propriety of its resources. In particular, neither the
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Propriety as a Basis for Semantics
adequacy (soundness, accuracy, truth, . . . ) of those representations nor any referential
relations their terms may enter into play any fundamental role in the determination of
the representation’s semantic content. One consequence is that anything like traditional
Tarskian semantics is inadequate for the task.
Contents
1 The Problem with Contemporary Semantics 2
2 The Problem of Semantics 4
3 Kinematics and Dynamics 8
4 The Breakdown of Models and the Kinematical Regimes of Propriety 13
5 Kinematical Propriety and Meaning 20
6 Dynamical Propriety and Meaning 23
7 From Pragmatics to Semantics 26
References 29
1 The Problem with Contemporary Semantics
Carnap (1942, ch. B, §7, p. 22) concisely expresses the seductive intuition that grounds essentially
all contemporary thought on the semantics of scientific theories: “. . . to understand a sentence, to
know what is asserted by it, is the same as to know under what conditions it would be true.” This
intuition underlies programs as diverse as rigid designation and the causal theory of meaning on the
one hand, and the sort of Beth semantics van Fraassen requires for his constructive empiricism on
the other, for it is as elastic as the notion of truth (adequacy, accuracy, reference, . . . ) itself.
As appealing as this idea is, however, its straightforward application leads to severe problems.
This is so no matter the details of the architectonic form of one’s account of a theory and its
semantics, whether it falls, e.g., under the purview of either the syntactical or the semantical account
of scientific theories and their semantics,1 or some other view entirely, so long as the foundation of
that view takes as ineliminable a concept such as truth, adequacy, accuracy, reference, . . . , that
must be grounded on accuracy of prediction—for without a minimal accuracy in prediction, one has
no grounds for postulating any such properties or relations.
The heart of the problem is that, according to any view that founds semantic content ultimately
on the accuracy of prediction, a theory tells us what the world would be like if the theory were a
1See, e.g., Brading and Landry (2006) for a concise, elegant statement of the two positions, and Suppe (1974) and
da Costa and French (2005) for more thorough exposition and elaboration.
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sound representation of it—what the world would be like if the theory were true of it, and nothing
more. But in fact, a physical theory in general tells us far more about the world than that. A
theory can tell us much about the character and nature of physical systems for which it does
not give accurate representations, systems, in other words, it cannot soundly represent in totality,
cannot be true of. One way to see this is that such accounts cannot differentiate inaccuracy from
inapplicability as a defect in a theoretical representation of a physical system: a semantics grounded
on a notion like truth, which itself must be founded on accuracy of prediction, can rule a model of
a system inadmissible only on the grounds that it does not represent the behavior of the system
accurately enough. That, however, is too coarse-grained a measure of the way theories can fail to
provide semantically sound representations of physical systems. In consequence, such a semantics
fails to capture much that fundamentally informs and embodies the empirical meaning of terms and
propositions in theories.
Consider the example of a representation of a body of liquid as provided by the classical theory of
fluid mechanics. When the liquid is not too viscous, is in a state near hydrodynamical and thermo-
dynamical equilibrium, and the level of precision and accuracy one demands of the representation
is not at too fine a spatiotemporal scale, then the classical theory yields excellent models of the
liquid’s behavior over a wide range of states and environments. When the state of the liquid, say,
begins to approach turbulence, the representation the theory provides begins to break down. It does
so, however, in a subtle way, one that cannot be wholly accounted for by adverting merely to the
fact that the theory becomes predictively inaccurate. In particular, there is a regime in which the
theory’s dynamical equations of motion no longer provide accurate predictions by any reasonable
measure, and yet all the quantities the theory attributes to the liquid (e.g., mass density, hydrostatic
pressure, shear-stress, et al.) will still be well defined, and all the kinematical constraints the theory
jointly imposes on those quantities (e.g., the continuity of mass-density, the conservation of energy,
the symmetry of the shear tensor, etc.), will still be satisfied. In a strong sense, then, the theory
can still provide a meaningful—and appropriate—model of the liquid even though that model is not
adequately accurate in all its predictions. This sort of situation, where the theory’s dynamics are
no longer adequate but its kinematics are still appropriate, shapes and provides at least part of the
physical meaning of terms like ‘mass density’ and ‘shear’—physical meaning that ipso facto cannot
be captured by a semantics that grounds meaning on predictive accuracy, for a semantics whose fun-
damental terms require, by way of relation to empirical phenomena, accuracy in prediction, cannot
admit such models as part of the theory, period, for the models are not accurate. Indeed, more than
just informing the meaning of such terms as ‘shear’, one can use the theory to say much of substance
about the shear tensor of the fluid in states the theory is predictively inaccurate for, and thus much
of substance about the behavior of the fluid’s shear in those states (as I discuss in §4 below).
More precisely, a view based ultimately on predictive accuracy is inadequate for (at least) two
reasons. First, it does not allow us, within the scope of the theory itself, to understand why
such models are not sound even though all the quantities the theory attributes to the system are
well defined and the values of those quantities jointly satisfy all kinematical constraints the theory
requires. Second, we miss something fundamental about the meaning of various theoretical terms by
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rejecting such models out of hand merely on the grounds of their inaccuracy. It is surely part of the
semantics of the term ‘hydrostatic pressure’, e.g., that its definition as a physical quantity treated
by classical fluid mechanics breaks down when the fluid approaches turbulence; because, however,
the theory’s equations of motion stop being accurate long before, in a precise sense, the quantity
loses definition in the theory and long before the kinematical constraints of the theory stop being
satisfied, any semantics that rejects the inaccurate models in which the term still is well defined will
not be able to account for that part of the term’s meaning. (I examine and argue for these claims
in some detail in §§4–5 below.) Thus, an adequate semantics for physical theory must be grounded
on notions of meaning derived from relations in some sense prior to the accuracy of the theory’s
representations of the dynamical behavior of the physical systems it treats, relations that govern the
propriety of the theory’s representational resources for modeling the system at issue.
My gripe is not with the idea of accuracy of prediction itself—only a fool or a philosopher would
deny that it must play some important role in the way meaning accrues to physical theories. I oppose
only its use as the foundation of meaning. My argument, then, is with accounts of semantics that
make semantic content devolve in the end upon the predictive accuracy of a theory’s representations,
irrespective of how exactly it is that the accuracy comes into play in fleshing out the theory’s semantic
relations and content. Tarskian semantics, for example, as deployed in much contemporary work, is
the archetype of such an account.
2 The Problem of Semantics
Because the meaning of scientific terms and propositions must rest on the knowledge we have of
the physical world, and most of all on the knowledge we have gained through controlled observation
and measurement, that is, through experiment, semantic content accrues to a scientific theory in no
small measure through the successful construction in its terms of representations of physical systems.
At bottom, then, what secure semantic content a scientific theory has must rest on the meanings
expressed in the sound articulation of experimental knowledge. This requires at a minimum that
we be able, at least in principle, to construct appropriate representations of actual experiments and
observations in the frameworks of our best scientific theories, that is, representations of physical
systems and experimental apparatus in relation to each other as required by particular, actual
experiments, not just representations of physical systems simpliciter, in abstraction from actual
experiments.2
Because this is not a standard view,3 I shall spend a moment explaining why I hold it. There
are three basic reasons. The first is a shallow but still important one: sometimes the nature of
the observational process itself results in “distortion” of the magnitudes measured, and a proper
computation of the real values of the magnitudes of the system’s properties requires explicit modeling
of the interaction between the measuring instrument and the system itself to correct for the effect.
2Indeed, it is our incapacity to do this in a consistent way in the context of quantum theory that lies at the bottom
of the Measurement Problem; this alone shows the importance of the idea.
3Fraassen (2008, ch. 12), for example, explicitly argues for the opposite conclusion.
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An example is stellar aberration: when light from a star enters a telescope, the motion of the
telescope transverse to the path of the light while the light traverses the telescope (e.g., from the
diurnal rotation of the Earth) makes the star appear displaced from its actual position in the sky;
in order to correct for the effect, one must compute the actual motion of the measuring device,
which requires an explicit representation of it in one’s model of the observation.4 The second reason
is a middling deep one. The quantitative results of all measurements and observations inevitably
deviate from those predicted by theory, even if only by a small amount; likewise, there is an inevitable
imprecision in the measured values. The errors and imprecision largely accrue to measurements on
account of systematic errors arising from the idiosyncratic nature of the particular experimental
apparatus used and the way it is actually deployed during the measurement process. In order to
compute reasonable values for the expected errors and imprecision (so as, for example, to be able to
say when a measured result differs by an inadmissibly large amount from a theoretically predicted
result), one must often take account of fine details of the measuring apparatus and the particulars
of its coupling to the system under study in one’s model of the experiment. Thermometry provides
an excellent example: different sorts of thermometers (bulbs of gas, pyrometers, inhomogeneous
thermocouples, et al.) couple to systems in radically different ways, the fine details of which must be
handled on a case-by-case basis in order to correct for the effects of such phenomena as convective
currents in fluids.5
The third reason is a deeper one. In order for theory to be able to provide guidance to experiment
in the design of new types of tools for probing novel sorts of phenomena and in the design of new
types of tools for probing known phenomena in novel ways, and conversely for experiment to provide
guidance to theory in modeling practically constructed novel ways of coupling to systems known
and unknown so as to place constraints on the possible soundness of theoretical description and
prediction, theory must be able to represent the fine details of the apparatus as actually used in
the experiment. This particular interplay between theory and experiment, in theoretical guidance
in the construction of instruments and in experimental constraint on the soundness of theory, is
one of the most profound ways that theory and experiment are able to make contact with each
other; without it, it is difficult to see how any empirical content could accrue to theory in the
first place. The search by Hertz for ways to produce and detect free electromagnetic waves as
predicted by Maxwell’s theory provides a beautiful illustration of the delicate dialectic required
between theory and experiment, especially in the construction and modeling of instruments in the
attempt to produce and probe a phenomenon so poorly understood. During most of the career of the
investigation, Hertz had very little idea what sorts of arrangements of what sorts of physical systems
would produce electromagnetic waves in the first place, and even less of what sorts of instruments
could reliably detect them; his search necessarily included the construction of finely detailed models
4See any good book on astrometry, such as Kovalevsky and Seidelmann (2004), for a full treatment of aberration
and the details of computing corrections for it.
5See, e.g., Benedict (1969). It is not the most up-to-date reference with regard to the international agreement on
defining the standard, practical methods for the determination of temperature (for which see, e.g., Lide 2005), but I
have found no better guide to the nuts and bolts of thermometry.
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both experimental and theoretical, each guiding the other in turn, of different proposed methods
of coupling of the electromagnetic field to its environment and instruments to try to realize those
couplings.6
That we must have the capacity in our theories to construct explicit models of complete exper-
imental situations including instruments and the actual methods of their deployment in order to
represent actual observations, however, immediately raises a serious problem, one that Stein (1992,
p. 12) trenchantly poses:
. . . we have no language at all in which there are well-defined logical relations between
a theoretical part that incorporates fundamental physics and any observational part at
all—no framework for physics that includes observational terms, whether theory-laden or
not. . . . I cannot think of any case in which one can honestly deduce what might honestly
be called an observation. What can be done, rather, is to represent . . . “schematically,”
within the mathematical structure of a theoretically characterized situation, the position
of a “schematic observer,” and infer something about the observations such an observer
would have.
In other words, we do not have a formal semantics of the theories of theoretical physics even min-
imally adequate for any account of their actual empirical application; this is not to say that such
applications in real scientific practice have no foundation or are unjustified, only that we have no
adequate comprehension of the process. Forget how we get the theory into or out of the laboratory—
how do we get the laboratory into the theory? This, I think, is the fundamental issue one must
address in trying to give an account of the semantics of scientific theories.
Stein is not entirely pessimistic about the possibility of the construction of a semantics adequate
for the empirical application of physical theories. In the same place as he sketches the problem, he
implicitly suggests one possible approach to it (ibid., p. 14; emphases are mine):
Now, Carnap’s scheme for philosophical analysis is admirably suited to just this situa-
tion. It is exactly the theories with a highly mathematical structure—the typical theories
of physics—that lend themselves, ipso facto, to construction as Carnapian frameworks.
The question of the empirical application of such a framework becomes a question of
pragmatics. I do not know how, systematically, a general theory of such empirical ap-
plication might be made; but at least I think the problem, in [this] neo-Carnapian form
. . . , finds a suitable locus and an intelligible formulation as a problem. And I think it
reasonably clear that to just the extent that we know in practice how to talk about the
empirical application of specific physical theories, we can formulate what we know how
to say in terms of the pragmatics of a Carnapian framework.
I think it is reasonably clear, indeed more than reasonably clear, that, from a knowledge of how
we apply theories in practice to model experiments, we can describe how we do in practice move
6See Hertz (1893, passim), including the preface by Helmholtz, for an absorbing account. See also the philosophi-
cally rich essay by Maxwell (1871) himself on this necessary sort of interplay between theory and experiment.
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meaningfully between the two. We can then found a semantics on the basis of our comprehension
of the pragmatics: if we can explain how we do represent experiments and the knowledge we gain
from them in a theory, and how we in turn apply this knowledge in practice, we will have eo ipso
characterized the pragmatics of that theory, and concomitantly have grasped the semantic nature
of the representations that the theory affords us of the phenomena it treats. We can then work
our way upwards to the refinement of a generic model of semantics, in a process analogous to
the construction of a scientific theory by the abstraction of formal structure from a collection of
experimentally derived, phenomenal propositions. (I discuss this idea, of founding semantics on
pragmatics, in §7.)
As I gestured at in section §1, I do not believe an account of semantics grounded on notions such
as truth or referential relations, which must in the end devolve fundamentally upon the predictive
accuracy of theoretical representations, can suffice. In this paper, I shall sketch the beginnings of
another way to try to explicate the semantics of a theory, one founded on the idea of the meaning
of predicates and propositions as a relation semantically prior to any concept that requires accuracy
in predictive representation. Meaning accrues to the elements of a physical theory, I shall argue,
by dint of the propriety of that theory’s conceptual and formal apparatus for the production of
possibly sound schematic representations of the physical systems the theory purports to treat.7 One
can think of propriety, in part, as what a theory must have for it to have the capacity to produce
propositions whose truth-value can be cogently investigated—not a fixation of truth conditions, but
rather the securing of the possibility to investigate whether or how truth-conditions for a given
proposition can be determined in the first place. A theory does not possess even the capacity to
be accurate or inaccurate in its treatment of a family of phenomena if it does not represent the
phenomena with propriety. It follows that one can not even entertain questions about the truth of
many sorts of propositions until one has determined that the theory has the apparatus, conceptual
and formal, to represent the system at issue with propriety, i.e., until meaning already has accrued
to the structures of the theory. Thus the notion of propriety is intended to capture the knowledge
we have in practice of how to talk about the empirical application of specific theories, and so will
found the pragmatics I claim can be used to ascend to the semantics.8
7I use ‘schematic representation’ rather than the briefer ‘model’ because the latter has acquired over the past
couple of decades manifold meanings and connotations in various debates and schools and issues, none of which are
relevant here. I intend the notion in only the thinnest of senses, something like a (generally complex) proposition that
renders in a theory an abstract, skeletal representation of a type or token of physical system. Indeed, often one can
think of such a thing, for my purposes, just as the theory’s equations of motion for the system and the kinematical
constraints it imposes on representations of the system, perhaps along with a concrete set of initial data if one treats
a particular situation of an individual system. I shall hereafter sometimes use ‘model’ for the sake of brevity, hoping
that this footnote will suffice to keep the reader from reading too much into the term.
8Parts of my account bear fruitful comparison to some of the ideas of Putnam in the 1970s and early 1980s
(especially as laid out in Putnam 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1983a, 1983b) on the sociolinguistic aspects of meaning, and in
particular the fact that to know the meaning of a word is not necessarily to have explicit knowledge of the truth or even
truth-conditions of particular propositions and the fact that it is at best questionable to demand an interpretation
in a Tarskian sense of a language whose use is already fixed, ignoring the ideas associated with his proposal of the
rigidity of reference, including essentialism and the causal theory of meaning, with which I utterly disagree. Much of
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Though it may sound surprising, I am able to go some way towards making the idea of propriety
precise and rendering to it substantive content with manifest physical significance: propriety comes
from the satisfaction of certain equations, the local kinematical constraints (which I define and
discuss below in §3), by the values of the system’s physical quantities; it does not, for example,
contra contemporary semantical and structuralist accounts of scientific theories, demand even partial
isomorphism of any structures in a theory’s model of a system and empirically determined data-
sets describing the behavior of the system. In this paper, however, I can give only a sketch of the
precise explication of the notion. In a full, rigorous treatment, the semantics would be formulated by
treating physical theories as something like Carnapian frameworks, as sketchily explicated, e.g., in
Carnap (1956) and more fully articulated in Carnap (1962); see Curiel (2011b) for such an attempt.
3 Kinematics and Dynamics
It is often useful when contemplating a physical theory, or as I will often say, theoretical framework
(or just ‘framework’), to distinguish its kinematical from its dynamical components. Because the
peculiar character of each plays a foundational and an architectonic role in the account of semantics
I sketch, I begin with a general account of this.
The difference between the kinematic and the dynamic manifests itself naturally in the family
of quantities a framework ascribes to a type of system. On the one hand, there are the quantities
that can vary with time and place while the system remains otherwise individually the same; these
are the dynamic quantities. On the other, there are the quantities that one assumes, for the sake
of argument and investigation, remain constant as the system dynamically evolves, on pain of the
system’s alteration in specie; these are the kinematic quantities. This classification belongs to
kinematics. A state of a system is the aggregation of the values of its physically significant properties
at an instant; it is represented by a proposition encapsulating all that can be known of the system
physically, at least so far as the theoretical and experimental resources one relies on are concerned.
If one can distinguish the values of the properties of the system at one time from those at another
time by the available resources, then the system is in a state at the first time different from that
at the second. A state, therefore, can be thought of as a set of the values of quantities that jointly
suffice for the identification of the species of the system and for its individuation at a moment.
As such, the state is the most fundamental unit of theoretical representation of a system as a
unified system, rather than just as (say) a bunch of random, unrelated properties associated with a
spatiotemporal region. The characterization of a system’s state belongs to kinematics. Every known
physical system has the property that at least some of its quantities almost always change in value
as time passes, which is to say, the system in general occupies different states at different moments
of time. The collection of states it serially occupies during an interval of time forms a kinematically
possible evolution (or just ‘possible evolution’ or ‘dynamical evolution’). The characterization of
possible evolutions belongs to dynamics.
that work provided both inspiration and foil for the working out of my own views.
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Roughly speaking, then, kinematics comprises what one needs to know in order to fix the type of
system at issue (is it a viscous fluid? an electromagnetic field?), and to give a complete description
of its state at a single moment—complete, that is, with respect to the framework at issue, i.e., a
consistent ascription of values to all the quantities it bears that are treated by a model of it in
the framework. Dynamics comprises what one needs to know in order to individuate a system and
to describe its behavior over time, in order to conclude, for example, that one’s model represents
this system right here by the determination of the values that a particular set of its quantities
respectively takes over the next 5 minutes, given both its state at the initial moment and the state
of its environment (the forces, if any, it is subject to) at that moment and over the course of those
5 minutes.
Kinematics does more than classify the quantities of a type of physical system into the kinematic
and the dynamic. It also imposes relations of constraint among their possible values, both constraints
that must hold at a single instant and those that must hold over the course of any of the system’s
possible evolutions. More precisely, there are two kinds of kinematical constraints a framework may
comprise: the evolutive, in which the relations include dynamical derivatives; and the static ones,
in which the relations among the quantities are strictly algebraic or contain derivatives that are, in
a technical sense, “non-dynamical”.9 Each of these two types is further subclassified into local and
global constraints: a local constraint, whether static or evolutive, involves only quantities that can
be attributed to a single state of the system, such as position; a global one involves a quantity that
cannot be attributed to any single state of the system, such as the period of an orbiting body. There
is a slight subtlety here. Any kinematical constraints that involve derivatives, strictly speaking,
depend on values of quantities at more than one state, even for local constraints; some global
constraints, moreover, can be formulated by laying down conditions that must hold at individual
states (e.g., that a Newtonian orbit be an ellipse can be formulated as a constraint on the value of
the spatial derivative at every point of the orbit, or on the sum of the distances from the foci at each
point); this seems superficially similar to some local ones, e.g., conservation of angular momentum,
which can also be formulated as a relation among derivatives at a point. Whether a constraint,
then, is global or local, may depend on whether one can formulate the condition over arbitrarily
short periods of a possible evolution, which one can for conservation of angular momentum (the
system satisfies angular momentum, say, during one part of an evolution but not another), but not
for whether a planetary orbit is an ellipse (where, by definition, one must wait an entire orbital
period before one can say the condition is satisfied or not).
In order to be able to formulate and evaluate any kinematical constraint, of course, the quan-
tities themselves in the terms of which the constraints are formulated must be well defined in the
framework. For this to be the case, it is necessary that one be able to formulate the local kine-
matical constraints and verify that they hold. It is in general not necessary that one be able to do
the same for global constraints. I shall at the moment only sketch my reasons for asserting this;
9Geroch (1996, p. 10) makes a similar distinction based on algebraic and differential relations among quantities,
though he does it in the service of differentiating the dynamical equations of a theory from the kinematical, not
differentiating among kinematical constraints.
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further arguments will have to wait for §4 below. Without the satisfaction of the local kinematical
constraints, the entire idea of the individual state of a system as represented by that framework
disintegrates—individual quantities do not stand in the minimal relations to each other required by
the theory—and without the idea of a state of a system, one can do nothing in the framework to
try to treat the system. More to the point, if the local kinematical constraints are not satisfied,
one has no grounds for believing that the system at hand is one of the type the framework treats.
Many different kinds of system, for example, have shear and stress—Navier-Stokes fluids, elastic
solids, ionically charged plasmas, electromagnetic fields, et al. To say that a system has a quantity
represented by a shear-stress tensor is not to have said very much. One must also know, among
other things, whether the shear-stress tensor must be symmetric, or divergence-free, or stand in a
fixed algebraic relation to another of the system’s quantities such as heat flux, and so on. Each
such possible condition is a kinematical constraint; and each different type of system that has a
quantity appropriately represented by a shear-stress tensor will impose different constraints on that
tensor. It is those constraints that differentiate types of physical systems, and not their dynamics.
Think of all the kinds of systems whose dynamics obey the equation of a simple harmonic oscillator
(pendulum, spring, vibrating string, electrical circuit, planetary orbit, trapped quantum particles,
. . . )—without question what differentiates them cannot be the form of their dynamics. It is only
the forms of the kinematical constraints one demands the quantities entering into the equations of
motion obey.
To illustrate the idea of a local static constraint, consider a few billiard balls on a frictionless
pool table. In order to apply Newtonian mechanics to model the system, we demand, for example,
that the linear momentum of a ball at a point stand in linear proportion to the velocity of its center
of motion at the same point, with the ratio being the inertial mass. This algebraic relation, indeed,
is definitive of linear momentum (or, if one likes, of velocity) in the Newtonian mechanics of rigid
bodies. If this relation does not hold between the linear velocity and linear momentum, as they
will not for example in a system with pronounced visco¨elastic or relativistic effects, then one cannot
appropriately apply the Newtonian mechanics of rigid bodies to represent that system.
As an example of a local evolutive constraint, let us examine the notion of a billiard ball’s velocity
in a little more detail. We demand that the ball’s velocity at a point and at the states kinematically
reachable from that point after a short temporal interval jointly satisfy a strict relation (except,
perhaps, at isolated, singular points), as follows. The kinematic velocity of a ball in any individual
state, as a quantity borne by that system, does not depend on the spatial position that state
represents the ball as occupying: a ball at any point of space may have any velocity, irrespective
of its position (ignoring constraints that external systems may impose). From a physical point
of view, however, the velocity of the ball is the rate of change of the ball’s position with time,
including its direction of change and its change in speed. We require of the ball’s evolution, in order
to be kinematically possible, that its velocity at a point as computed by direct measurement of
spatial and temporal distances traveled be, in the limit of smaller and smaller spatial and temporal
distances over which one measures, an ever better approximation to the kinematic velocity the
state of the evolution ascribes to the ball at that point. In other words, we require as a local
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evolutive kinematical constraint that the velocity, as a physical quantity in its own right, be the
temporal derivative of position, and thus that it as well can be represented as an element of a
real, three-dimensional, Euclidean vector space. The physical operation of composing velocities
(through collision, say) also manifests just the sort of linear, additive structure as vectors. We
require that our kinematical representation respect, indeed that it manifestly encode, these relations.
A representation of Newtonian velocity by a real number, say, rather than by a vector would lack
propriety in this precise sense, for a real number cannot be a temporal derivative of a position in a
three-dimensional space.
Although there is much more to say about the dynamical structure of a physical theory, for
the purposes of this paper I must rest content with remarking that it includes in general a rich
and deep lode of topological, geometrical, analytical and algebraic structures on the space of states
that in particular encode relations among entire classes of dynamic evolutions; those relations often
take in part the form of a set of partial-differential equations expressed in terms of the kinematic
and dynamic quantities, the solutions to which represent the totality of the system’s kinematically
possible dynamic evolutions starting from all kinematically possible initial states. These equations
are known as the system’s equations of dynamical evolution (or equations of motion).10 The canonical
example is Newton’s Second Law: a Newtonian body accelerates in direct, fixed proportion to the
forced applied to it, the ratio of the two being the kinematic quantity known as the body’s inertial
mass.
Now, kinematical constraints are differentiated from equations of motion by the fact that the
particular, concrete form of a kinematical constraint is fixed once and for all, irrespective of the
interactions the system may enter into with other systems (such as a measuring apparatus in the
laboratory). By contrast, the particular, concrete form of a system’s equations of motion depends
essentially on the particular interaction (if any) the system enters into with another system in its
environment—e.g., what external forces, if any, act on the system. According to this convention,
the first two Maxwell equations,
∇ ·B = 0
B˙ = −∇×E
(3.1)
those governing the magnetic components B of the electromagnetic field, are both local kinematical
constraints, the former static (because the only derivative that appears is spatial, i.e., not dynamical)
and the latter evolutive. They are kinematical constraints and not equations of motion because
neither changes form no matter the environment the electromagnetic field evolves in (ignoring the
possibility of magnetic monopoles). Indeed, even though one of the equations includes the time-
derivative of another quantity, making it look like an equation of motion, I claim that from a
physical point of view one must think of them as kinematical constraints. The crux of the matter
is that the electromagnetic field couples with other systems only by way of their manifestation of
electric charge ρ or current j, but those quantities when present change the form only of the other
10See Curiel (2005) for a comprehensive discussion of a theory’s dynamical structures.
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two Maxwell equations,
∇ ·E = ρ
E˙ = j−∇×B
(3.2)
those governing the electric components E of the electromagnetic field. In effect, the difference
between the two pairs of relations shows that, in a precise sense, the magnetic field couples directly
with no physical quantity of any other system in that the presence of electric charges and currents
does not alter the form of its two defining equations. (The magnetic field does couple to electric
current “to second order” by way of the second of equations (3.2), whence Ampe`re’s Law.) Thus the
form of equations (3.1) does not depend on the particular dynamical evolution the system manifests
at any given time. Nonetheless, not just any old thing counts as a magnetic field no matter how
it evolves and no matter what relations hold among its quantities at different points; only those
things that behave like magnetic fields can be magnetic fields, which in this case means the identical
satisfaction of the first two Maxwell equations. Again, that is why satisfaction of the local constraints
is necessary for the definition of the state of a system: without their satisfaction, one has no reason
to think that the state represents that species of system at issue.
The discussion has implicitly drawn out one of the most fundamental and, for my purposes,
salient differences between the kinematic and the dynamic: frameworks do not predict kinematical
constraints; they demand them. I take a prediction to be something that a theory, while meaningfully
and appropriately modeling a given system, can still get wrong. Newtonian mechanics, then, does
not predict that the kinematical velocity of a Newtonian body equal the temporal rate of change of
its position; rather it requires it as a precondition for its own applicability. It can’t “get it wrong”.
If the kinematical constraints demanded by a theory do not hold for a family of phenomena, that
theory cannot treat it, for the system is of a type beyond the theory’s scope. If the equations of
motion as one has modeled them are not satisfied, however, that may tell one only that one has not
taken all ambient forces (couplings) of the system with its environment into account; it need not
imply that one is dealing with an entirely different form of system. This is a serious difference in
physical significance among the types of proposition a theory contains, which, among other things,
should be reflected in the way an account of the meaning of a theory assigns significance to the
theory’s structural elements. Thus satisfaction of the local kinematical constraints is required as
a precondition for the appropriate application of a theory.11 This is not true of the dynamical
relations the framework posits. As we will see, a framework may appropriately treat a family of
phenomena even when it does not model the dynamical behavior of all members of the family to
any prescribed degree of accuracy, i.e., even when the equations of motion are not satisfied in any
reasonable sense (and thus when, according to the standard conception of semantics, the schematic
11The claim is not that these propositions are “empirically unrevisable” along the lines, say, of a Reichenbachian
coordinating definition; indeed, these propositions are not only empirically revisable but are in fact revised from time
to time (for example, as with the relation of position and velocity in special relativity, in quantum mechanics, . . . );
when they do fail to hold empirically for a given system—as they will in some circumstances—then any theory that
demands them is inapplicable. That is all.
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representations of those phenomena cannot contribute to the semantic content of the terms occurring
in those representations).
4 The Breakdown of Models and the Kinematical Regimes
of Propriety
Now, a system may initially be treated with accuracy by a theory but then slowly fail to do so
as environmental conditions or its state changes; in other words, a framework’s model of a system
may be adequate under some conditions, but come increasingly not to be so as those conditions
change. I now consider some of the ways that a previously adequate model may break down and
fail to provide an empirically substantive representation of the phenomenon at issue. The difference
between, on the one hand, the propriety of a theory and its models in representing a class of
phenomena and, on the other, their empirical adequacy in doing so shows itself clearly in those sorts
of failures. First, I will state in schema three relevant relations in which a framework purporting
to treat a system may stand towards it with respect to the framework’s representational resources,
or, put differently, three relevant regimes in which a system may manifest itself with respect to a
framework’s representational resources. I will then work in some detail through two examples to
argue that these three are appropriate for explicating one fundamental notion of propriety required
for semantics. (In §6 below, I shall introduce one last regime to add to this list, and concomitantly
a sharper notion of propriety required for a complete account of semantics.)
As a matter of brute scientific fact, a theoretical framework has at least three regimes:
regime of impropriety all systems for which not all local kinematical constraints are satisfied:
the theory’s quantities are not explicatively defined in the context of the framework; a fortiori
the equations of motion cannot even be formulated
regime of kinematical propriety all systems for which all the local kinematical constraints are
satisfied: all the theory’s quantities are well defined; some global kinematical constraints may
not be satisfied; and the equations of motion are not satisfied
regime of adequacy all systems for which everything is well defined and satisfied: a state of har-
mony and bliss in which systems and theories move together hand in hand with the equanimity
of the blesse´d gods
A framework can be used with propriety to treat a type of physical system it putatively represents if
and only if the system’s environment and its own state jointly permit the determination, within the
fineness and ranges allowed by their nature, of the system’s quantities over the spatial and temporal
scales appropriate for the representation of the relations among the quantities manifested in the
phenomena at issue. Thus, because we need only the definitions of the quantities to formulate and
solve all the equations the theory poses, kinematical propriety is equivalent to the having of good
definitions of all quantities simpliciter, without worrying about whether they satisfy all the global
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kinematical constraints or the equations of motion. In order for the quantities to be well defined,
they must satisfy a subset of the kinematical constraints, the local ones, which by definition are
constraints on values of magnitudes accruing to individual states of the system, the fundamental
unit of representation the theory provides; being able to formulate and evaluate the local kinematical
constraints so as to have their solutions within the admissible deviance from observed values for them,
as allowed by the theory, is in fact the precise and rigorous definition of kinematical propriety. This,
by the way, is why kinematical propriety is characterized in terms of kinematical constraints—why
I give preference to the local kinematical constraints rather than to some other form of relation the
theory imposes, demands or predicts holds among the values of a system’s quantities: because the
cogency of the representation of single states is the necessary and sufficient condition for a theory’s
being able to represent a system as a system of its type, and the satisfaction of the local constraints
is the condition that guarantees not only that all quantities are well defined, viz., that they have
the capacity to individuate single states and identify them at a moment of time, but even more that
they are quantities associated with that kind of system.12 (I shall sketch in §5 below another reason
for the primacy of kinematical constraints when it comes to the meaning of theoretical terms and
structures.)
As an example, consider first Navier-Stokes theory, the classical theory of viscoe¨lastic, thermo-
conducive fluids, such as liquid water or nitrogen gas. Using the notions of §3, I first sketch the
kinematics and dynamics of the theory by giving the kinematic and dynamic quantities it predicates
of them and gesturing at the kinematic and dynamic relations obtaining among those.13 The theory
ascribes three kinematic quantities to any physical system it treats: bulk viscosity, a measure of re-
sistance to compression and expansion; shear viscosity, a measure of resistance to deformation that
does not change the fluid’s volume; and thermal conductivity, a measure of the rate at which ther-
mal energy disperses throughout the substance. If we cannot meaningfully predicate these quantities
of a physical system, then it cannot be a Navier-Stokes fluid. The dynamic quantities standardly
attributed to a Navier-Stokes fluid are mass fluid density, gross fluid velocity, hydrostatic pressure,
the flux of heat, and the distribution of stress and shear.
The kinematic and dynamic quantitities jointly satisfy five fixed kinematical constraints, and
a sixth idiosyncratic to each different species of fluid, the equation of state. An example of one
of the fixed constraints is the requirement that the shear-stress tensor be symmetric, which means
physically that any stress as measured across a (perhaps only imagined) surface in the fluid in a
particular direction and any shear along a surface in any particular direction will be counterbalanced
by an equal stress and shear across and along, respectively, the same surface in the directions opposite
those of the first. This is a static, local constraint. Another is the equation of continuity. It states
that the flux of fluid into any region must equal the flux of fluid out of that region plus the rate
at which the amount of fluid in the region increases or decreases; it states, in other words, that
no fluid can be created ex nihilo or destroyed ad nihilum, and, correlatively, that the fluid can be
appropriately modeled as a continuous distribution of matter. This is an evolutive local constraint.
12I thank Chris Pincock for pushing me on this point.
13See, e.g., Lamb (1932) or Landau and Lifschitz (1975) for a comprehensive treatment of Navier-Stokes theory.
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The dynamical structure consists largely of the two Navier-Stokes equations, the theory’s equations
of motion, jointly governing the dynamical evolution of the mass density, the fluid velocity, the
shear-stress and the heat flux. To fix the values of all 3 kinematic quantities is to define a species of
Navier-Stokes fluid—or, in more loaded terms, to define a “natural kind” of fluid in the only sense
the theory can support. Anything that has the same values for all kinematic quantities as does water,
e.g., is according to Navier-Stokes theory the very same stuff as water, for it is indistinguishable
both kinematically and dynamically from water: the same initial conditions yield the same dynamical
evolutions.
Now, every species of physical system as represented by a given framework has a characteristic
length (or characteristic interval of time, or characteristic energy, and so on), the characteristic
scale, beyond which the terms designating the system’s quantities lose definition in the framework.
Typically there is only one such length, at which all quantities simultaneously lose definition, for a
Navier-Stokes fluid being a few orders of magnitude greater than the length of the mean free-path
of the fluid’s constituent particles (the average spatial distance a particle travels between collisions
with another), in this case sometimes called the hydrodynamical scale.14 At this length scale, one
cannot even formulate much more verify the local constraints. The shear-stress, e.g., stands proxy
for the mean acceleration of the fluid’s constituent molecules, but below the hydrodynamic scale
the population samples of molecules are too small and vary too much for this average to have any
statistical significance. Physically, this means that we cannot design instruments that appropriately
couple to the quantity below that scale: different sorts of experimental devices for coupling to
molecular acceleration, all with sensitivities below the hydrodynamic scale, will record markedly
different “shear” and “stress” depending on properties of the joint system that one can safely ignore
at larger scales, for instance the exact distribution of collisions of the fluid’s molecules with the
device’s. In such a case, whatever the devices measures, it is not a quantity that conforms to the
notion of shear-stress as represented by Navier-Stokes theory—for one thing, it will not satisfy a
physical condition of the sort captured by the symmetry of the shear-stress tensor. The definitions
of the other quantities fail in similar ways.
It is not obvious at first glance, but the satisfaction of the kinematical constraints of Navier-
Stokes theory requires that the system at issue exist in conditions close to hydrodynamical and
thermodynamical equilibrium. This follows from the definition of the characteristic scale, which
makes clear the possibility that a turbulent or otherwise strongly disequilibrated fluid can manifest
higher-order molecular effects, making themselves felt in dynamical pathology in the behavior of the
fluid’s quantities, even while the quantities themselves remain defined in at least experimental terms,
so to speak.15 The first constraint, symmetry of the shear-stress tensor, for example, requires that
14There is no a priori reason why the definitions of all the different quantities, both kinematic and dynamic, that
appear in the Navier-Stokes system—bulk viscosity, shear viscosity, thermal conductivity, temperature, pressure, heat
flow, stress distribution, and all the others—should fail at the same characteristic scale, even though, in fact, those of
all known examples do, not only for Navier-Stokes theory but for all physical theories we have. This seems, indeed, to
be one of the markers of a physical theory, the existence of a single characteristic scale of length (equivalently: time,
energy) for its kinematic and dynamic quantities. Why should this be?
15‘Higher-order’ here refers to the moments of the distribution function and correlatively of the Maxwell-Boltzmann
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the distribution of the accelerations of the fluid’s molecules does not vary too strongly and erratically
over regions several orders of magnitude larger than their mean free-path. No quantity that does
not manifest the behavior encoded in the symmetry of the shear-stress tensor, however, can be in
the context of Navier-Stokes theory shear-stress: it cannot be modeled by Navier-Stokes theory and
it cannot be measured experimentally in any way relevant to Navier-Stokes theory, for, among other
problems, Navier-Stokes theory can give no appropriate guidance in the construction of experimental
tools for its unambiguous determination. This follows from the fact that the conditions under which
the shear-stress begins to lose symmetry are of the same sort as those in which devices that couple
to molecular acceleration in different ways begin to provide markedly different readings, as happens
for devices with sensitivities below the characteristic scale. At these scales, the quantitative artifact
resulting from measurements by a particular kind of device may still have (some of) the crude
characteristics of a shear-stress, but it cannot be explicatively represented by Navier-Stokes theory.
We are in the regime of impropriety. The laboratory cannot get into the theory.
The second constraint, the principle of the continuity of mass-density, does not hold of all fluids
under all conditions. If a strong enough current passes through water, some of the water will denature
by electrolysis into hydrogen and oxygen. A similar effect would occur by the application of a heat
shock to the water while keeping it under great pressure. Bombarding the water with dense enough
sprays of neutrons of high enough energy will rupture the hydrogen and oxygen atoms themselves,
resulting in clouds of electrons, protons and neutrons, as well as momentary, transient bursts of more
exotic particles such as pi-mesons. Under some of these conditions, the fluid will have no well defined
mass density as a measure of the amount of water at hydrodynamic scales, and so there can be no
question of its continuity, and a fortiori no question of the applicability of Navier-Stokes theory for
its representation. Under similar but milder conditions, the constraint will fail in a weaker way, one
in which the mass density manifests gross discontinuities at the hydrodynamic scale, say in those
localized regions where the molecules denature, or just in the presence of certain kinds of shock waves
or turbulence, and so will not satisfy the equation of continuity everywhere. This latter, milder form
of the failure, however, need not imply that the mass density itself, as a physical quantity borne
by the fluid, loses either experimental definition on its own or even explicative representation in
Navier-Stokes theory. It may still have experimental definition, for example, in so far as different
sorts of devices purporting to measure it will return consonant results across most of the fluid most
of the time, and so one can still model the quantity using the theory, since all the couplings the
theory allows for—all those different devices—still more or less agree among themselves. This is an
example of a weak failure of an evolutive, local constraint that does not invalidate the definition
of the quantities entering into it, showing that the division into four regimes for a given system
and framework is not always possible without adverting to pragmatic concerns, such as the nature
and purposes of the investigation at hand. We may still be in the regime of kinematical propriety;
the determination whether or not is a pragmatic affair, depending on the sorts of considerations I
discuss in §7 below.
collision equation one must take account of in giving an adequate treatment of the system in molecular kinetics. See
Sommerfeld (1964, ch. v, §§41–43, pp. 293–318) for a discussion.
Erik Curiel 16 July 6, 2011
Propriety as a Basis for Semantics
Finally, Navier-Stokes theory can fail when the equations of motion themselves do not hold even
though all the system’s kinematical constraints are satisfied (and so all the theory’s quantities are
well defined). In other words, there may be systems in states or environments for which the equations
of motion predict values different from those measured by an amount greater than the admissible
deviance of predicted from observed behavior. The model provides for such a system complete,
appropriate representations of all quantities, both kinematic and dynamic, throughout the entirety
of the system—in particular all kinematical constraints are satisfied—but the system falls outside
the model’s acceptable deviation from accuracy in prediction.16 If I apply a heat shock to a glass
of wine, for example, Navier-Stokes theory cannot handle the resulting temperature gradient and
the relaxation effects (the higher-order terms from the distribution function), in the sense that the
equations of motion yield solutions that do not represent the physical evolution of the system to any
reasonable degree of accuracy. Nonetheless, all the theory’s quantities can be well defined and the
kinematical constraints satisfied by any reasonable measure one wants to use, if the heat shock is
not too great. We are in the regime of kinematical propriety.
According to a semantics that requires predictive accuracy, such as a Tarskian one, the preceding
discussion of Navier-Stokes theory would, strictly speaking, be meaningless. I hope it to be clear
that it is not meaningless.
The reader may worry that these suggested definitions and arguments implicitly turn on the
peculiar character of hydrodynamical theories and their relation to underlying theories of molecular
kinetics. To assuage that worry, I shall now show that Newtonian gravitational theory has the same
set of regimes, characterized by the same conditions. To make the case, I examine the history of
the investigation of the precession of the perihelion of Mercury’s orbit, an important example of
an actual case in which a system’s falling in a theory’s regime of propriety but not in its regime of
adequacy had profound consequences for the development of physical theory.17
Before diving into the details, a few words about terminology are in order. The orbit of a body
revolving around a central one precesses about the central body if, at the completion of one period
of the orbit, the form of the orbit remains more or less unchanged but a major axis has rotated
from its starting inclination. Say, for a planet in an elliptical orbit about the sun, that its major
axis when continued in a right line points at a given moment in the direction of the North Star, and
then at the completion of the planet’s orbit starting from that initial moment it points in a direction
oblique to the original line by 1◦; then the orbit precesses by 1◦ per orbital period.18 Because the
major axis of an elliptical orbit contains the perihelion (the point in the orbit closest to the central
body) and the aphelion (the point in the orbit farthest from the central body), we also say that the
perihelion and the aphelion themselves precess, and do so at the same rate. An arcminute is 1/60th
16In this case, the system’s dynamical evolution does not constitute a model in the sense of Tarskian semantics, for
the values of the quantities do not satisfy all the semantical requirements for being an interpretation of the model. In
particular, it does not satisfy the predicate representing the system’s equations of motion.
17See Harper (2011) for an extended and philosophically rich discussion of the topic touching on many questions of
relevance to us here.
18In this case the orbit is not even a closed curve, much more an ellipse, but the amount of actual precession in the
planet’s orbit is so slight that it is an excellent approximation to treat it as as ellipse.
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of a degree, and an arcsecond is 1/60th of an arcminute, or 1/3600th of a degree; the expression
‘4′ 16′′’ designates a measure of 4 arcminutes and 16 arcseconds. The planets’ actual precessions are
so slight as to make it more perspicuous to express their magnitudes in arcminutes and arcseconds.
Now, Newton (1726, Scholium, Prop. xiv, Bk. iii) knew that his theory predicted that the
perihelion of Mercury’s orbit precesses. His theory when applied to the known observational data
predicted its precession at 4′ 16′′ a century, or about 2.5′′ a year. At the same time, astronomers
knew the period of Mercury’s (sidereal) orbit with a precision of 1/10, 000th of a Terran day, or
about 8.5 seconds (Newton 1726, Bk. iii, phenomenon iv), and with perfect accuracy, according to
today’s best datum: 87.9692 Terran days, the same down to the ten-thousandth part as the most
current value given by NASA.19
In the event, though, Newton’s prediction was not sound; it had to await Le Verrier (1859) for
the accurate determination of the rate of the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, and the calculation
that it inadmissibly differed from any value derivable from the Newtonian theory.20 Le Verrier
(1845) had suspected already that the precession of Mercury’s orbit posed problems for Newtonian
gravitational theory, with an observed period of 8′ 47′′ per century and a predicted value of 9′ 26′′,
a discrepancy of 39′′ per century, but at that time he could not rule out the possibility that the
discrepancy arose from problems with his models.21 (In the language I used earlier, he could not
have said definitively the discrepancy did not come from his not having taken into account all the
couplings of Mercury with its environment, rather than from the impropriety of the framework
for modeling Mercury’s motion.) It was not until 1859 that he had satisfied himself that the best
models constructible in Newtonian gravitational theory as applied to the best data available could
not explain the discrepancy, not even by the postulation of hitherto unobserved celestial bodies or
any other such ad hoc devices. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century the inexplicability of
the aberrant precession was such a great embarrassment that many eminent physicists had already
concluded that Newtonian gravitational theory could not be fundamentally correct, even before the
development of special relativity (a historical fact that seems to be not so well known as it ought).22
19This accuracy is all the more astonishing when one learns of the difficulties attending attempts to observe Mercury
from the Earth: in the lower latitudes it is visible in its own right (as opposed to being visible as a negative image
during transits of the sun) for only a short time every few years, and then for only a few hours in the very early
evening and the very early morning; in the higher latitudes, such as those of England, it is visible even less of the
time. In a country whose meteorology is so hard on the astronomer as England’s, these difficulties are exacerbated.
See, for example, Flamsteed (1835, passim). Copernicus himself is reported to have expressed regret that he himself
never had the opportunity to observe Mercury at all.
20It is amusing (and perhaps not surprising) that this Le Verrier who heralded the first unequivocal failure in
Newtonian gravitational theory’s adequacy is the same who had achieved perhaps its greatest triumph since Newton’s
own time, the theoretical prediction of the existence of Neptune based on deviations of Uranus’s observed orbit from
its theoretically predicted form.
21Newton’s deduction of the precession of Mercury’s aphelion as 4′ 16′′ per century is thus off by a factor of 2,
remarkably accurate given the difficulties in the observation of Mercury and the concomitant meagreness of the data
available to him. Le Verrier is said to have remarked,  Nulle plane`te n’a demande´ aux astronomes plus de soins et
de peines que Mercure, et ne leur a donne´ en re´compense tant d’inquie´tudes, tant de contrarie´te´s. 
22See Newcomb (1895a, 1895b, 1905) for an extended discussion and summation of the experimental knowledge of
the aberrant precession at that time, and Freundlich (1915) for an exhaustive argument that Newtonian gravitational
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Back-of-the-envelope, geometrical computation shows that, in light of the level of precision and
accuracy of the knowledge of the temporal period of Mercury’s orbit in Newton’s day, the position
of Mercury’s perihelion could in principle have been measured to an accuracy of about 0.1′′ a year,
well within striking range of the verification of the prediction of its precession at the end of the
nineteenth century, even if one allows for an error of an order of magnitude. This is not to say
that they had in hand at Newton’s time the amount and quality of data actually to perform the
requisite computations. Their level of precision and accuracy in the ascertainment of the period
of Mercury’s orbit did not derive from direct observation, but rather from sophisticated analysis
of the cumulative data from thousands of years of less precise measurements that were not suited
to the task of the ascertainment of the changing position of Mercury’s perihelion with respect to
the fixed stars.23 The most important point for our purposes, though, is that no fundamental lack
in the experimental understanding and expertise of the day stood in the way of Newton’s and his
contemporaries’ having made such measurements.24
Thus, although Newton did not know it, his theory by its own lights cannot adequately model
the full dynamics of Mercury’s orbit. Nonetheless, Newton had used the observationally determined
orbit of Mercury as part of the foundation of the derivation of the universality of gravity in Book iii
of Principia. I claim that he was justified in doing so, even from the perspective of one who knows
his theory to be inadequate for Mercury’s orbit, because one can formulate the local kinematical
constraints the theory requires and verify that they hold for all the quantities associated with
Mercury’s orbit for the data available to Newton and the machinery of his theory as developed at
the time. For example, it is straightforward to verify from the data Newton had available to him
that at any point of Mercury’s orbit, its angular velocity stands in linear proportion to its angular
momentum (as measured by the area swept out in a unit of time by a line joining the planet to the
sun), with the ratio being given by its inertial mass, all to well within the experimental accuracy
of the data. The only proposition encoding some of Mercury’s dynamics that Newton used as an
assumption in his derivation of universal gravity, moreover, the so-called Harmonic Rule of Kepler,
also held to within the limits of observational accuracy available at the time.25 The Harmonic
Rule states (in modern terms) that the squares of the orbital periods of the planets are directly
proportional to the cubes of the semi-major axes of the orbits. Thus, to apply the Rule, one needs
to be able to make sense of two global quantities associated with the planet’s motion, the period of
the planet’s orbit and the length of the orbit’s semi-major axis, and to be able to verify that a fixed
theory could not account for it. To get a sense of how small the angle 39′′ is, imagine the appearance of the diameter
of a penny from a distance of about 30 miles. This makes an angle of that measure. It is a testament to the profound
entrenchment of Newtonian gravitational theory at the time that a discrepancy of this infinitesimal angle per century
caused such consternation in and provoked such labor from the leading lights of the scientific community for almost
a century.
23See Herz (1887, 1894) and Dreyer (1906) for expository and critical discussion of those analyses.
24Indeed, several of the aberrant features of Mercury’s orbit, as compared to the behavior of the orbits of the other
planets, was well known already to Ptolemy (1998, Bk. ix, §§6–10). (Of course, Ptolemy discussed the anomalies in
the behavior of Mercury’s perigee and apogee, the points in its orbit closest to and furthest from the Earth, rather
than those in that of its perihelion and aphelion.)
25See Harper (2011) for an argument to this effect.
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relation holds between them, both of which Newton could do and did. Thus, even though Newtonian
gravitational theory cannot adequately treat the full dynamical details of Mercury’s orbital motion,
i.e., even though Mercury falls outside the regime of adequacy of Newtonian gravitational theory,
that theory still can represent that motion in a way that is not only meaningful in itself, but, more
importantly, in a way that can have such profound consequences as its being able to be legitimately
invoked in such a weighty investigation as Newton’s in Book iii of the Principia. And that is precisely
because Mercury falls within the regime of propriety of Newtonian gravitational theory: its motion
satisfies the theory’s kinematical constraints and even some of the theory’s dynamical propositions,
even though it does not satisfy the theory’s full equations of motion by the theory’s own lights.
5 Kinematical Propriety and Meaning
Now, if a system falls within a framework’s regime of propriety but not in its regime of adequacy,
the model the framework provides for representing the system has at least the semantic content
accruing to it in virtue of the fact that it is an appropriate representation of the system: the terms
referring to the system’s quantities are well defined and have at least so much semantic content as
accrues to them from the fact that they jointly satisfy the framework’s kinematical constraints. If
the system crosses over into its regime of adequacy, that is, if the model becomes an adequately
accurate representation of the system, then the model gains no semantic content independent of that
already having accrued to it from its propriety. To see this, assume the model were to gain new,
independent semantic content when the system passes into its regime of adequacy, that semantic
content encoding the fact that it was not before but is now an accurate model of that system,
which, ex hypothesi, is independent of the semantic content it already had in virtue of being in the
framework’s regime of propriety. Thus the model must have had some independent semantic content
accruing to it before designating the fact that it was inaccurate as a model of that system. It is also
(almost certainly) true, however, that the model does not accurately represent the growth of a tree
or the passage of neutrinos through interstellar space or the sinking of the Titanic, but its lack of
accuracy in these cases does not by itself contribute to or otherwise inform its semantic content. The
lack of accuracy of the model in its representation of a physical system bears on its semantic content
only in so far as we already know or have good reason to suspect that the model has propriety in
the representation of that sort of system. Because the model does not represent the growth of a tree
with propriety, its lack of accuracy as such a representation does not bear on its semantic content
at all, or, more precisely, the model does not give us the tools to investigate whether it represents
the growth of the tree, and so it has no semantic content that pertains to its possibly being a model
of the tree, accurate or not. The accuracy of the model can inform its semantic content only if we
already know the model does in fact represent the system with propriety. The propriety of a model
must be already in place for its accuracy or lack of accuracy to inform its semantic content in any
way. It follows that propriety is semantically prior to accuracy, i.e., any semantic content accruing
to a model encoding its accuracy must depend on the semantic content it already has in virtue of
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its propriety.26 I emphasize: this is not to say that the fact that a model’s predictions are accurate
does not contribute any semantic content to the theory at all; only that such content as it does
contribute depends on the semantic content the model already has in virtue of its belonging to the
theory’s kinematical regime. Thus one cannot found a semantics on the accuracy of a framework’s
models.
Indeed, one can say more, and more precisely, about how the meaning that accrues to a theory
in virtue of the satisfaction of the kinematical constraints must be prior to whatever meaning comes
from the accuracy of predictions made by its equations of motion. I noted briefly, in §3 above,
that in general there are relations among a system’s possible dynamical evolutions that encode its
equations of motion. In fact, those relations are formulated on the system’s space of states by the
use of global structures that are kinematical in nature, both in the sense that they are fixed once
and for all for all systems of the relevant species and, even more importantly, in the sense that they
encode kinematical constraints themselves. Those structures, moreover, are exactly what one uses to
formulate the equations of motion for the system. One familiar example of such a global kinematical
structure is the canonical symplectic structure on the space of states of a Hamiltonian system,
which is encoded in the Poisson structure on the family of all possible Hamiltonian flows for the
system.27 That structure, among other things, encodes the kinematical constraint of conservation of
energy and that of the Poission-bracket commutation relations that hold among any complete set of
canonical variables, configuration and momentum, that characterize the system; that is part of the
physical significance of the symplectic structure, part of the meaning that an adequate semantics
of Hamiltonian mechanics should attribute to it. It is also the structure that one uses to formulate
Hamilton’s equation itself. In a very real sense, therefore, one cannot check the validity of the
Hamiltonian equations of motion—for one cannot even formulate them—unless one is already in a
position to verify that those kinematical constraints hold, which is to say, unless one already knows
how to define the symplectic structure on the space of states. Knowing how to define the symplectic
structure, however, and being able to verify that the kinematical constraints hold, does not imply
that the system’s evolution satisfies the Hamiltonian equations of motion.
To take another example, consider a generic Newtonian system, i.e., one whose motion satisfies
Newton’s Second Law; it is simple to show that the family of all vector fields representing possible
dynamical evolutions on the system’s space of states naturally accrues the structure of an affine
space, modeled on the vector space of vector fields representing all possible interactions the system
can enter into with other systems (all possible couplings to its environment).28 That affine structure
precisely encodes the kinematical constraint that the system’s velocity-like quantities (e.g., ordinary
velocity for a Newtonian particle or angular velocity of a planet in its orbit) are dynamical derivatives
of its configuration-like quantities (in this case, the particle’s spatial or planet’s angular position).
26In fact, I think a stronger claim is true: because judgments of soundness are pragmatic to the core, accuracy is
not a semantic property of the model at all, but is rather a meta-linguistic property of the model’s semantic content
(i.e., of the model’s propriety). I do not have room to go into these matters here. I discuss them in Curiel (2011b).
27See Curiel (2011a) for a discussion of the example and proof of the claims made below.
28Again, see Curiel (2011a) for a discussion of this example and proof of the claims made here.
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As in the Hamiltonian case, it is also the case here that this global kinematical structure is required
for the formulation of the system’s equations of motion. When one constructs the representation of
the system in the Lagrangian framework, it turns out that the affine-space structure of the space
of solutions to Newton’s Second Law suffices to characterize on the tangent bundle of configuration
space a tensor field—the almost-tangent structure—that is the geometrical entity the Euler-Lagrange
equation is constructed out of, just as the symplectic structure is for Hamilton’s equation. Once
again, then, it is the case that one must know how to define a global kinematical structure, one
that encodes fundamental kinematical constraints, before one is even in a position to construct the
equations of motion much more to check to see whether or not they are satisfied.
Such global kinematical structures have manifest physical significance, and so should be treated
by a semantics for the theories comprising them. We need these structures in order to be able to
formulate the equations of motion, even if the equations of motion are not adequately satisfied—we
need to be able to formulate the equations in order to check whether or not they are in the first
place. And so we must know the meaning of those global structures in order to check whether the
equations are satisfied. This shows that satisfaction of at least some of the kinematical constraints
is a necessary condition for the formulation, and a fortiori for the satisfacton, of the equations of
motion. This provides further reason why priority must be given to kinematical constraints in a
theory’s semantics.
Still, one may think that traditional accounts of semantics should be able to accommodate the
point of view I advocate, perhaps after some minor revision.29 On the face of it this should be feasible,
since my program still does ground its fundamental terms on the accuracy of a set of relations. In this
case, the accuracy is that of the kinematical constraints of a theory, not its equations of motion, but
surely that makes no nevermind. This misses the profound semantical difference between kinematical
constraints and equations of motion, however. As I have stressed, a theory requires the satisfaction
of its kinematical constraints as a precondition for its own applicability; it does not predict them,
as it does the results of its equations of motion. To show the profound difference this makes from
a logical point of view, consider an attempt to capture the program I propose in the framework
of Tarskian semantics. The kinematical constraints, as constant semantical content common to
all models—something like Carnapian L-sentences, but with non-trivial semantic content—, should
be fixed as part of the initial interpretative stage, in which the designata of the elements of the
syntax are given. The fixing of the interpretation of the syntax in a Tarskian semantics, however,
involves only the fixing of the designation of constants and predicates and the fixing of the range
of bound variables, etc.; my conception of propriety, however—that the kinematical constraints be
identically satisfied—demands the satisfaction of actual propositions, which goes far beyond the
scope of giving a standard interpretation to a syntactical system, and so nothing like a traditional
Tarskian semantics can be used to formalize the sort of semantics I advocate. More fundamentally,
there is the fact that nothing like a Tarskian semantics can accommodate models in which some of
the propositions are false, such as those of systems that are in a theory’s regime of propriety but
29I thank Miklos Redei and Clark Glymour for pushing me on this point.
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not its regime of adequacy.
Before moving on, this is a good place to remark on another type of global structure that has
semantical content that can be accommodated by the kind of account I advocate here, but cannot
be so accommodated in any straightforward way by the semantical view of theories. It is tempting
to think of the regime of adequacy as something like the set of the theory’s Tarskian models, but
that will not do. Entire families of models (classes of solutions to the equations of motion) may
have on their own semantic content that forms part of the semantic content of the theory, but which
cannot be expressed in terms of the semantic content of individual models. For example, the claim
that the equations of motion have a well set initial-value formulation in the sense of Hadamard
indubitably informs part of a theory’s semantic content, but it is one that, in its essence, consists of
relations among models and cannot be reduced to the interpretation of a single model. A fortiori,
that semantic content cannot be captured by a Tarskian semantics, which by definition excludes the
possibility that semantic content resides in relations among models.
6 Dynamical Propriety and Meaning
In the opening sentences of his posthumously published essay “Thought”, Frege remarks that, as
the concept “good” shows the way in ethics and “beautiful” in æsthetics, so must “true” in logic.
I am not entirely sure what he meant, but I think it was something related to this: we must
look, in deductive logic, for forms of reasoning that preserve truth in moving from antecedents to
consequences. In the same vein, I say that “propriety” shows the way in the semantics of scientific
theories: in order to explicate the notion of meaning in terms of propriety, we must find forms of
reasoning that preserve propriety from initial propositions in a model to derived propositions in the
model, and, more generally, that preserve propriety from initial models to other models derived from
them.
The notion of propriety I have so far treated places only weak constraints on the acceptability of
a theory for modeling phenomena. That a model has kinematical propriety for representing a system
signifies, as its name suggests, only that, so far as the resources of the framework are concerned, it
is possible that a system exists whose kinematics the model represents with propriety. Nothing I
have said about it so far implies any restriction on the propriety of the dynamics of a model. We
want a fuller-blooded notion of propriety to complete our semantics, one that expresses the fact that
the framework represents with propriety both a system’s kinematics and its dynamics, whatever
that may come to for dynamics—in other words, we want a notion of propriety that captures the
semantic content that does accrue to the model in virtue of the fact that it is accurate. In the event,
the characterization of a form of reasoning that preserves propriety in the derivation of propositions
and models from others will at the same time illuminate the character of the richer form of propriety
we require, as the investigation of logical deduction at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of
the twentieth centuries led to new ways to comprehend the semantic character of truth.
Now, one cannot ask for a clearer, conciser summation of what a good, accurate model in science
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consists of than that given by Hertz (1899, intro., p. 1):
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give
them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the
images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured.
Appropriate, accurate models, in other words, represent physical systems, albeit with this peculiar
proviso: the construction of representations of the system in the theory’s terms at a moment com-
mutes with the physical evolution of the system as determined by experimental measurement. Say
that one first constructs an appropriate model of a physical system, constructs a proposition in that
model to designate the state of the system at a given moment and then represents the dynamical
evolution of the system starting from that initial state by the application of the model’s equations
of motion to the proposition so as to yield a proposition designating the same system after, say, five
minutes; next one prepares an actual system of that type in the initial state at issue, lets the system
evolve for five minutes from that initial state, and then, by the use of experimental observations
on the system in that final state to determine the values of the system’s quantities, constructs in
the theory’s terms a proposition that designates the final state. Then, if the model represents the
system with dynamical propriety, as I will call it, the proposition derived by the former, theoret-
ical procedure will be in some important sense the same as the proposition derived by the latter,
experimental procedure.30 Of course, these two procedures will never yield quantitatively identical
results, so what is to count as “the same”? The argument of the paper points to a ready answer:
the two procedures must yield representations that are the same in the sense that they are both
propositions, in the same appropriate model, that represent with kinematical propriety the same
state of the same physical system, to within the model’s admissible inaccuracy. They are appropri-
ate, adequate descriptions of the same single state of the system. It follows that the theory must
model the system with kinematical propriety at every stage of its evolution as well, to ensure that
the local kinematical constraints are satisfied and so the quantities well defined, if there is to be
nothing physically or theoretically special or distinguished about the moments one chooses to make
one’s determinations.
This discussion suggests an explication for the idea of dynamical propriety. Harking back to our
brief discussion of velocity in §3, the point of the proposition that vectorial addition appropriately
represents the physical addition of velocities is not that physically and mathematically adding the
velocities of the cue balls always yields the same answer quantitatively—we do not require that
the evolved system and its derived representation in the model be the same up to a fixed, desired
degree of accuracy. We rather demand that the two commute in the sense that the same kinematical
30If one likes, a dynamically appropriate model is a “functor” from “the category of scientific representations of a
class of physical systems” to “the category of a class of physical systems”, where the “objects” of the first are states
of a system as modeled in the given representation, and those of the second are the physical states of the system, and
the “morphisms” of the first are the rules of derivation the representation makes available, and those of the second
are the actual dynamic evolutions of the physical systems. This idea provides the basis for one way to make precise
the idea of designation in the context of a semantics of the sort I propose. See Curiel (2011b) for a complete, formal
explication.
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structure still accrues to them, within a given kinematical regime—they both yield a representation
the same with respect to the potential to have accuracy, even if the model’s regime of adequacy
does not comprise the system. The framework continues to embody all the same structures as are
manifested in the phenomena over the course of the system’s evolution. The kinematics and the
dynamics in their entirety must mutually respect each other: the semantic designation of the values
of the system’s quantities and all the allowed theoretical combinations of the designations of these
values (e.g., the algebraic addition of one with another), as semantic operations, commute with
all physical combinations of the fields and the measurement of the relevant quantities as physical
operations modeled by the framework. The order in which one performs the physical and the
semantic operations and evaluates the physical and the semantic attributes and relations, whether
one mixes them or performs them sequentially, does not affect the representation one produces
of the final state of the system. A model for which this is true has dynamical propriety. The
straightforward continuation of the discussion in §4 shows that a theory can have dynamical propriety
in modeling a system even when the system is not in the theory’s regime of adequacy, for dynamical
propriety requires the framework’s kinematical constraints be satisfied over finite stretches of the
system’s dynamical evolutions, which does not by itself imply that the system’s behavior satisfies
the framework’s equations of motion. (Obviously, the system must be in the framework’s regime
of kinematical propriety.) Thus I add to the list on page 13 another regime coming after that of
kinematical propriety and before that of adequacy, viz., that of dynamical propriety, to construct
the complete list of all semantically relevant regimes a framework possesses:
regime of impropriety all systems for which not all local kinematical constraints are satisfied:
the theory’s quantities are not explicatively defined in the context of the framework; a fortiori
the equations of motion cannot even be formulated
regime of kinematical propriety all systems for which all the local kinematical constraints are
satisfied: all the theory’s quantities are well defined in individual states; the equations of
motion can be formulated but they are not satisfied
regime of dynamical propriety all systems for which all kinematical constraints are satisfied in
the strong sense that theoretical representation commutes with experimental determination
over the course of finite stretches of dynamical evolutions: all quantities are well defined over
the course of dynamical evolutions, and the equations of motion can be formulated but they
are not satisfied31
regime of adequacy all systems for which everything is well defined and satisfied: a state of har-
mony and bliss in which systems and theories move together hand in hand with the equanimity
of the blesse´d gods
In conclusion, I give the briefest of sketches of a way to explicate meaning in the account I
have developed. The semantics I propose bases the meaning of structures and terms in a scientific
31It may happen for some frameworks that there is no difference in extension between the regimes of kinematical
and dynamical propriety.
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framework on the propriety of the representation of systems by models in the framework, and, more
specifically, on the conditions under which a model represents a (type of) system with, respectively,
each of the two kinds of propriety, kinematical and dynamical: we know the meaning of a model when
we know the conditions under which it represents systems with kinematical and dynamical propriety.
It is illuminating to compare Carnap’s (1942, ch. B, §7, p. 22) characterization of meaning, with
which I began the paper: “. . . to understand a sentence, to know what is asserted by it, is the same
as to know under what conditions it would be true.” For me, the meaning is the same as to know
under what conditions it is sensical to investigate the formulation of possible conditions of its truth,
for this can be done only in so far as one already knows the theory represents the system with
propriety. The problem of meaning now becomes: given a model in a framework, how does one
determine its conditions of propriety? From a pragmatic point of view, to know those conditions
is the same as to know the family of systems the model represents with propriety, which is to say,
those systems the model, as a semantic element of the framework, designates. This is the solution
to our problem, stated in experimental terms.32
7 From Pragmatics to Semantics
Now that I have sketched the semantics, it is time to take a step back to make explicit its relation
to pragmatics, how it is grounded upon our knowledge of how to apply theories and frameworks in
actual practice. This will pay the promissory note I drew in §2.
If we were developing a semantics that at bottom grounded semantic content on something like
truth as characterized by predictive accuracy, we could at this point call upon Stalnaker’s admirably
elegant and succinct summation of the appropriate relation between pragmatics and semantics in
such systems (1981, pp. 44–45, emphases mine):
Now that we have found an answer to the question, “How do we decide whether or not
we believe a . . . statement?” the problem is to make the transition from belief conditions
to truth conditions; that is, to find a set of truth conditions for statements . . . which
explains why we use the method we do use to evaluate them.
In other words, the relation of pragmatics and semantics in a system that grounds meaning in truth
conditions should reflect the relation between epistemology and metaphysics: one’s formal truth
conditions (semantics by way of metaphysics, as truth conditions ought not depend on the context
32I do not have room to discuss the matter here, but I remark in passing that the account of propriety I have
given here carries over intact to the semantical analysis of at least some quantum theories. For example, the non-
commutative algebraic structure manifested in our experimental comprehension of the organization of and relations
among the spectral lines of Hydrogen as represented in experimental models such as those used by Rydberg and
encapsulated in the Ritz Principle illustrates the point, for the representation of those phenomena by the models
quantum theory constructs in the terms of the non-commutative algebra of Hermitian operators on a Hilbert space
has both kinematical and dynamical propriety in my sense. See Bohr (1954) and Curiel (2011b) for discussion. The
interested reader should also consult Connes (1994, ch. 1, §§1–2, pp. 33–43) for an exposition of closely related points
(though he does not mean to address issues of the sort I do).
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of the individual knower) should relate in the appropriate way to belief conditions (pragmatics by
way of epistemology, as belief conditions depend on the context of the individual, actual believer).
This must hold at a minimum if our beliefs are even to have a shot at tracking truth. In a system
such as the one I advocate, by contrast, in which meaning cannot be grounded on truth conditions,
such as accuracy in prediction, but is rather grounded on the way a framework provides appropriate
structures for the representation of a given (type of) system, the relation between pragmatics and
semantics should remain silent about the relation between epistemology and metaphysics; in the
best of cases, it should be compatible with many possible such relations.
As I have argued, in order to know how to investigate whether or not a theory provides an accurate
representation of a system—whether that system falls in the theory’s regime of adequacy—one must
be able to verify first whether or not the system satisfies the theory’s kinematical constraints, i.e.,
whether or not it falls in the theory’s regime of propriety. Our problem, therefore, the analogue
to Stalnaker’s, is how to move from an understanding of how to check whether or not a theory’s
kinematical constraints are satisfied to an understanding of how to use the resources of the theory
to represent a system once we have verified the kinematical constraints are satisfied. As Stalnaker
says, moreover, our account of this process should “[explain] why we use the method we do use to
[verify] them.”
Now, as a practical affair, how to verify whether or not the kinematical constraints of a theory
hold will differ from system to system, and even from state to state for the same system. The
constraints on the definability and measurability of a quantity in a given theory, and in general
the understanding of how to check the accuracy of the kinematical relations posited to hold among
the quantities, depend on the parameters of particular types of systems under certain kinds of
conditions; one cannot characterize them generically in an attempt to constrain the definability and
measurability of that quantity and that relation once and for all, without qualification. For example,
in checking to see whether the conservation of energy as formulated in Navier-Stokes theory (one
of its kinematical constraints) holds of a particular body of fluid, one may require the following
conditions to hold and make the following posits, inter alia:
1. the ambient electromagnetic field cannot be so strong as to ionize the fluid
2. the gradient of the fluid’s temperature cannot be too steep near equilibrium
3. only thermometric systems one centimeter in length or longer are to be used to measure the
fluid’s temperature, and the reading will be taken only after having waited a few seconds for
the systems to have settled down to equilibrium
4. the chosen observational techniques to be applied, under the given environmental conditions
and in light of the current state of the fluid, yield data with a range of inaccuracy of ±1%,
with a degree of confidence of 95%
5. a deviance of less than 3% of the predicted from the observed behavior of the system’s tem-
perature, taking into account the range of inaccuracy in measurement, is within the admissible
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range of experimental error for the chosen experimental techniques under the given environ-
mental conditions, in light of the current state of the fluid
Once one is satisfied all such conditions are met and all such posits appropriately implemented, all
part of the preparation of the system for experimental study, one can begin measuring the fluid’s
quantities to see whether conservation of energy as formulated in Navier-Stokes theory holds for the
fluid.
Now, the statement of the conservation of energy as formulated in the theory of Navier-Stokes
fluids accounts for only a small number of the types of energy a physical system may possess. It
does not account, for instance, for radiative energy and certain types of chemical energy. If one
throws a chunk of pure sodium into a bucket of water, Navier-Stokes theory cannot model the
explosive result and so, a fortiori, cannot keep track of the chemical energy released. So far as
the theory is concerned, energy in that reaction is not conserved. In order to satisfy the principle
of the conservation of energy as encoded in the kinematics of Navier-Stokes theory, the fluid must
exist in a condition close enough to thermodynamical and hydrodynamical equilibrium so that the
great majority of its free energy exists in a form dependent only on the quantities Navier-Stokes
theory makes available for the modeling of its state, viz., the gross fluid velocity, the hydrostatic
pressure, the heat flux and the shear and stress distribution in the fluid. In order, therefore, to
ascertain whether the relation as formulated by the theory holds, one measures the contributions
from all these terms separately, combines those experimentally determined values in the theoretically
required way and checks whether or not the resultant number is close enough to zero. If it is, the fluid
satisfies conservation of energy as formulated by Navier-Stokes theory. If it does not, then there are
other energetic processes occurring in the fluid that the representational resources of Navier-Stokes
theory cannot account for, such as an exothermic chemical reaction (the exploding sodium). In this
case, because the system does not satisfy the theory’s kinematical constraint, Navier-Stokes theory
does not have propriety in representing it. This all forms part of the pragmatics of the theory. None
of the propositions one formulates during the entire procedure is “representational”, for one is still
trying to determine whether or not the theory is appropriate for the representation of the fluid in
the first place.
Say that one has in fact managed to verify that all the kinematical constraints hold over finite
stretches of time. One now knows that Navier-Stokes theory does have propriety in representing the
system, since the system is in the theory’s regime of dynamical propriety, and so the propositions
encoding the kinematical constraints acquire representational force. One has moved from pragmatics
to semantics in the application of the theory. Among other consequences of that move, one is now in
a position to attempt to ascertain whether or not the Navier-Stokes equations of motion accurately
model the fluid’s behavior, i.e., whether the system is in the theory’s regime of adequacy. Note,
however, that, even before that determination is made, the theory does in fact represent the system
in a semantically rich and robust sense. If it then turns out that the theory also accurately predicts
the dynamical evolution of the fluid, then the theory’s representation of the system gains that further
semantic content; but even if it does not accurately predict the dynamical evolution of the fluid, I
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hope it to be clear by now that the theory’s terms still meaningfully designate the fluid’s quantities
and the theory meaningfully represents at least that much of the nature of the system encoded in
the relations among those quantities captured by satisfaction of the theory’s kinematical constraints,
for one now knows the theoretical species of system one is dealing with.
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